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NOTES

Default Breakdown: The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties'
Inadequate Framework on
Reservations
ABSTRACT

The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
attempted to give some order to the confusion that was treaty
law after World War ff. One treaty issue that was particularly
in need of codification was the law governing reservationsto
treaties. With the growing number of participants in the
international community making universal agreement more
difficult, the frequency of reservations, as a vehicle for
circumscribing disagreements in treaty negotiations,
increased. However, most practices regarding reservations
severely limited the ability of states to make reservations
successfully. To remedy thatproblem, the Vienna Convention
adopted aflexible approachto treaty reservations, applicable

to treaties of all types, under which reservations are
presumed permissible and acceptance of reservations is
achieved easily. This Note analyzes the Vienna Convention's
articles on reservations as they apply to different types of
treaties, concluding that the drafters of the Convention went
toofar in the direction offacilitating reservations. The author
argues that the Convention does not adequately protect the
integrity of treaties or the right of non-reserving states to
retain their bargainedfor rights and obligations. Moreover,
the Convention allows treaties to disintegrate into a
patchwork of small agreements rather than serve as one
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useful multinationalagreement. To remedy the problems of

the Vienna Convention's approach to reservations,the author
suggests reversing the presumption in favor of the
permissibility of reservations and either developing a
different framework for each type of treaty or requiring
treaties to establish an authoritative decision-makers to
resolve reservationissues.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Until the latter part of the twentieth century, international
law governing treaties provoked substantial disagreement among
legal scholars. Although some disagreement continues, the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties' (Vienna Convention or
Convention) codified customary international law on the subject,
and the international community accepts most of the Convention
as the authoritative codification of contemporary international
treaty law. 2 Only a limited number of states have become parties
to the treaty, however. 3

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1.
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980)
[hereinafter VCLT]. The Convention is commonly referred to as the Treaty on
Treaties. See Richard D. Kearney & Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64
AM. J. IN 'L L. 495 (1970).
Herbert W. Briggs, United States Ratification of the Vienna Treaty
2.
Convention, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 470, 471 (1979); Maria Frankowska, The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INTL L.
281, 286 (1988). By 1971, the United States had recognized the Convention as
the "authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice." Id. For cases in
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) cited various provisions of the
Vienna Convention as the International law, see Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
Case (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3, V 96 (Dec. 19); Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K.
24, 36 (Feb. 2); Appeal Relating to Jurisdiction of ICAO
v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J.-3,
Council (India v. Pak.), 1972 I.C.J. 47, 1 38 (Aug. 18); Advisory Opinion, Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibla
(South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1970 I.C.J.
16, 94 (June 21).
As of December 31, 1992, 72 states had ratified and 46 states had
3.
signed the 1969 Vienna Convention. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the
Secretary-General,Status as of 31 December 1992, U.N.Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/ 11 at
789. The United States has signed, but not ratified, the Convention. Id. at 790.
Even though it has no legal force for non-parties, most states regard the Vienna
Convention as the authoritative declaration of international treaty law,
considering its provisions to reflect the current status of the law and considering
themselves bound by it. Briggs, supra note 2, at 471; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 102, cmt. f. But see,
Frankowska, supra note 2 (arguing that only certain provisions of the Vienna
Convention represent customary international law).
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One of the most confusing areas of law addressed by the
Convention is the set of rules governing reservations. 4 The
Vienna Convention defines a reservation as "a unilateral

statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when
signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty,
whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of
5
certain provisions of the treaty in application to that State."
6
Reservations must be distinguished from amendments.
Reservations modify a treaty only in regard to specific provisions
and only in the relations of the other states with the reserving
state;7 reservations do not modify treaty relations between states
that are parties to the treaty without reservations. 8 Amendments,
on the other hand, ordinarily modify treaty relations between all
parties.9
The frequency of reservations to treaties increased
dramatically during the twentieth century.1 0 The speculated

4.

Kearney & Dalton, supra note 1, at 509.

The problem of reservations

was the first major Issue taken up by the conference. Id.
5.
VCLT, supra note 1. art. 2,
1, § d. Reservations may be labelled
"declarative interpretations" or a host of other stylistic phrasings that in fact
represent attempts to modify the legal effect of treaty provisions. Id.
6.
The Vienna Convention contains separate provisions governing each,
addressing reservations in Part II, Section 2, and amendments and modifications
in Part IV. See VCLT, supra note 1.
7. William W. Bishop, Jr., Reservations to Treaties, 103 R.C.A.D.I. 253
(1961). Regardless of whether the other states accepted or objected to the
reservation, treaty relations are modified between those parties. See VCLT, supra
note 1, art. 20, 4; art. 21.
8.
Bishop, supra note 7, at 253.
9.
Id. States retain the right to refuse to accept an amendment unless the
treaty specifies that a qualified majority of the parties may bind all of the parties.
See VCLT, supra note 1, art. 40. A reservation sometimes evolves into an
amendment if all parties decide to make the same reservation. This scenario
actually occurred when the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, and
Italy all made reservations rejecting Article 10 of the 1899 Hague Convention.

The other parties to the treaty then excluded Article 10 from their ratifications as
well. Bishop, supra note 7, at 274.
10. See John K. Gamble, Jr., Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: A
Macroscopic View of State Practice, 74 AM. J. INTL L. 372, 376-78 (1980). The
twentieth century also has witnessed more treaties prohibiting reservations.
FRANK HORN, RESERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIVE DECLARATIONS TO MULTILATERAL
TREATIES 113 (1988). International Labor Conventions prohibit reservations as a
general rule. The 1952 Universal Copyright Convention and the 1964 Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the International Carriage by Air
both expressly prohibit reservations.
Other treaties, such as the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf, prohibit reservations only to certain provisions. Id. The
change in frameworks governing reservations might have precipitated the
increase in reservation prohibitions. Establishing default frameworks allowing for
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reasons for this change include the increase in the number of
states participating in the international community, the increase
in popular control over domestic approval of treaties, and the use
of majority voting in approving the specific provisions of
treaties. 1 1
The Vienna Convention attempted to devise a fixed, allencompassing set of rules to govern the permissibility and legal
effects of reservations to all types of treaties. 1 2 Unlike other parts
of the Convention, the articles on reservations were not a
codification of customary international law. Rather, the articles
were an attempt at progressive development of the law.' 3 The
drafters agreed to, and the negotiating states subsequently
14
adopted, an experimental hybrid system to govern reservations.

In practice, the articles have not accomplished the drafters' goals
of equitably balancing the rights of both reserving and nonreserving states and of simultaneously encouraging universal
acceptance of treaties and protecting their integrity. 15
This Note analyzes the Convention's framework governing
reservations in light of different types of treaties. First, Part II
analyzes and critiques the reservation provisions of the Vienna
Convention. Part III applies the Convention's framework to
various types of international agreements, noting the problems
that arise in each context. Part IV then offers three modifications
to the Convention designed to create alternative frameworks
better tailored to the specific needs of different types of
international agreements. The Note concludes that the drafters
should reserve the presumption favoring reservations and either
adopt default rules tailored to the type of treaty or establish an
authoritative decisionmaker on reservations issues. Thus, the
flexible construct enunciated in the Vienna Convention should
serve as a beginning-not an end-in the quest for a workable
approach to treaty reservations.
reservations requires the drafters of a treaty that does not allow for reservations

to include an express provision to that effect rather than relying on the unanimity
rule.
11. Bishop, supra note 7, at 245, 264.
12. See VCLT, supra note 1, arts. 19-23.
13. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of the Second Part
of Its Seventeenth Session and Eighteenth Session, U.N. GAOR 21st Sess., Supp.
35, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (1966) [hereinafter ILC Report]. The
No. 9,

members of the 1LC did not attempt to delineate which provisions represented
codification of customary international law and which were progressive
developments. Most scholars agree, however, that the provisions relating to
reservations constituted progressive development. Id.
14. This system applies absent provisions governing reservations in a treaty
itself. See Infra note 97 and accompanying text.
15. ILC Report, supra note 13, at 13.

424

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

II.

[Vol. 27:419

THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

A. Background

The uncertainty of treaty law after the Second World War led
the United Nations General Assembly to request that the
International Law Commission examine and propose changes for
the law of treaties. 16 The Commission prioritized this problem at
their first session in 1949 by placing the law of treaties on their
list of topics suitable for codification. 17 The Commission then

spent the next seventeen years writing the draft articles to the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
In 1951, when the General Assembly requested an advisory
opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the
permissibility of reservations to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,1 8 the General
Assembly simultaneously requested that the International Law
Commission prepare a report on the issue of reservations to
multilateral conventions.1 9 The Commission, after examining
practice to that time, recommended the adoption of the unanimity
21
rule20 with certain minor modifications.
The Commission's view changed substantially by the time it
submitted the final draft articles to the General Assembly in

16. G.A. Res. 478, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 16 Nov. 1950 [hereinafter
Resolution 478(V)I. The General Assembly also held lengthy debates specifically
on the question of reservations in 1951, 1958, and 1959. Kearney & Dalton,
supra note 1, at 510.
17. ILC Report, supra note 13, at 255.
18. Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277(1951).

19.

Resolution 478(V), supra note 16.

20.

The unanimity principle requires that all parties to a treaty consent to a

reservation before a reserving state may become a party to that treaty. If a treaty
Is not yet in force, different systems may be used. Either all signatories to the
treaty must consent or only those signatories that have already ratified the treaty
must consent. One objection bars the reserving state from becoming a party.
HoRN, supra note 10, at 15-16. An objection does not bar a reserving state from

ever becoming a party to the treaty. A state may always withdraw its reservation
and accept the treaty as a whole, thereby becoming a party. See Bishop, supra
note 7, at 275.
21. ILC Report. supra note 13, at 320. The ILC found the ICJ's compatibility
criterion objectionable as a rule of general application. Id.
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1966.22 Articles 19 through 2323 of the Commission's final
product offered a flexible construct governing reservations to
treaties, incorporating two approaches: the Pan-American system
and the ICJ's "compatibility with the object and purpose" criterion
from its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 24
The Pan-American System arose during the period between
the World Wars as an alternative to the unanimity rule and
acknowledged the inherent right of states to make reservations. 2 5
Under this system, before ratification, a state had to submit
proposed reservations to the depositary 26 for circulation to the
other signatories. The responses of the other signatories, either
accepting or opposing the reservation, did not limit the reserving
state's options. 27 The reserving state only had to take their
replies into account in deciding whether to ratify the treaty
subject to the reservation. 2 8 If the reserving state ratified the
treaty subject to the reservation, then it became a party to the

22. The ILC stated that the rapid expansion of the international community
since 1951, increasing the number of participants in multilateral treaties, had
reduced the practicality of the unanimity rule and that the de facto system for all
new multilateral treaties for which the Secretary-General of the UN acted as
depositary had approximated the flexible rule. (In another resolution the UNGA
instructed the Secretary-General to apply the rule of the Genocide Convention to
all future, and eventually all, agreements concluded under the auspices of the UN
that did not contain express provisions governing reservations.) ILC Report, supra
note 13, at 321-22; see also HORN, supra note 10, at 21 (discussing the slow
"shift in the attitude of the ILC"). None of the 110 delegations at the two sessions
of the Vienna Convention favored the unanimity rule. Belinda Clark, The Vienna
Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination Against
Women, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 281, 289 (1991).
23. Articles 19 through 23 are draft Articles 16 through 20.
24. Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention, 1951
I.C.J. 15 (Advisory Opinion, May 28) [hereinafter Genocide Convention Opinion].
25. Convention on Treaties, signed in Habana on Feb. 20, 1928, OAS Law
and Treaty Series No. 3. Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., 1950, p. 21 ff.
The Pan-American Union became the
[hereinafter Habana Convention].
Organization of American States. SHABTAi ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN Tim LAW OF
TREATiES 1945-1986 354, 426 (1989). The Convention was never widely ratified.
Bishop, supra note 7, at 278. European authors criticized this approach as
unsuitable for normative treaties. Clark, supra note 22, at 290.
26. All states deposit ratifications with a depositary, ordinarily designated in
the treaty. The depositary performs a communications exchange, informing
interested states of developments regarding the ratifications (the numbers,

reservations, objections, etc.).

Whether a depositary's role extends

to

pronouncing the legal effect of reservations has sparked significant debate. Oscar
Schachter, The Question of Treaty Reservations at the 1959 General Assembly, 54
AM. J. INT'L L. 372, 375-76 (1960); see also Kearney & Dalton, supra note 1, at
510.
27. Bishop, supra note 7, at 280.
28. Id.
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treaty subject to the responses of the other states. 2 9 The treaty
applied as modified by the reservation to those parties that
accepted the reservation,3 0 but no treaty relations took effect with
31
those parties that objected to the reservation.
The ICJ first enunciated the second component of the
Convention's construct, the "object and purpose" test, in its 1951
Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention. 3 2
The ICJ held that the test for treaty reservations was their
compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty. 33

Although the test specifies two seemingly objective criteria, each
state individually applies the test, thus transforming it into a

subjective standard.34 The ICJ appeared to expect the test to
limit a state's ability both to make and to object to reservations.3 5
The test prevents reserving states from making incompatible
reservations and allows the states confronted with reservations to
object to a compatible reservation only for substantive reasons.35
29. Rules Adopted by the Governing Body of the Pan American Union on the
Procedureto be followed In the Deposit of Ratlications, Resolution =XIX of 4 May
1932 [hereinafter Resolution XXIX] (See ILCYB 1956:I, p. 250).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Genocide Convention Opinion, supra note 24, at 23-24, 29.
33. Id. at 29. This approach was not unanimously favored. The ICJ divided
sharply seven to five regarding the appropriate law governing treaty reservations.
Id. The dissent advocated the unanimity principle. Id. at 31-38. In finding that
the unanimity rule had not evolved to the level of customary International law, the
ICJ noted the new need for flexibility in treaty-making. Id. The ICJ specifically
noted a more general resort to reservations in the post-World War H era, the great
allowance made for tacit assent, and examples of state practice allowing reserving
states to become parties to a treaty in spite of objection to the reservation by
some parties. Bishop, supra note 7. at 288-89. A key issue was whether the
drafters planned for reservations to the agreement. Planning for reservations
automatically negates application of the unanimity principle. Clark, supra note
22, at 292-93.
34. Genocide Convention Opinion, supra note 24, at 23-24; Clark, supra
note 22, at 293.
35. Genocide Convention Opinion, supra note 24, at 24. The ICJ attempted
to achieve a balance between the sovereign right of a state to make a reservation
and the seemingly increasing need for reservations in multilateral treaties against
the integrity of the treaty and a party's right not to be bound without Its consent.
Id. Factors affecting the Court's decision included: the universal character of the
United Nations, under whose auspices the Genocide Convention was written; the

wide degree of participation desired: the use of majority voting to adopt the
provisions of the Convention; the purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose of
the Convention; and the fact that the contracting states had no interests of their
own but one common interest under this treaty (whereby no advantages or
disadvantages accrued to any particular parties). Id. at 23. See Bishop, supra
note 7, at 288-89 for an analysis of these factors.
36. Bishop, supra note 7, at 289.
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The

evolution

of

the

Commission's

opinion

involved

substantial debate and disagreement.3 7 When the Commission
arrived at its hybrid framework, there was less than a
consensus. 38 The Commission members agreed that when a
treaty is concluded among small groups of states, unanimous
in the
consent to reservations must be presumed necessary
39
treaty.
the
in
indication
contrary
express
absence of
Disagreement arose, however, over the standards that should
apply to general multilateral treaties. 4° Some members of the
Commission advocated the collegiate system to protect the
integrity of the agreement. 4 1 The collegiate system prohibited the
reserving state from becoming a party with the reservation if more
than a certain percentage of the parties, ordinarily one-fourth or

one-third, objected to the reservation. 42 Commission members
that supported the collegiate system faulted the hybrid approach
43
They
for requiring states to object expressly to a reservation.
would
negligently
always
almost
parties
more
or
one
that
believed
fail to object, thereby guaranteeing a reserving state of belonging
44
to the treaty with regard to those states at least.
Other Commission members believed that the proponents of
the collegiate system overestimated the impact of reservations on
the treaty.45 In their view, reservations ordinarily related only to
particular provisions, therefore having a minimal impact on a
Even if the reservation related to a
treaty as a whole. 4 6
comparatively important provision, it would still have a minimal
impact as long as the reservation was made by only a few
They believed that if a sufficient number of states
states. 47
became parties to the treaty accepting the 4 sgreat bulk of its
provisions, the treaty's integrity would endure.
37.

ILC Report, supra note 13, at 323.

38.

Id.

39.

Id.

40.

Id. at 322-23.

41.

See Clark, supra note 22, at 291-92, 298.

The United Kingdom,

Australia, and Sweden were the main supporters of the collegiate system. Id.
42.
43.

ILC Report, supra note 13, at 325.
Id. at 323.

44. Id.
45. Id.

46. Id. In their view, the majority of reservations proposed by states were

solely "to execute the act necessary to bind [the reserving states] finally to

participating in the treaty." Id. at 324. This necessity arises out of different
political, cultural, and economic conditions. Allowing for reservations of this type
also furthers the goal of universality; otherwise, certain states might be unable to
participate at all. Id.
47. Id. at 323.
Others, particularly the East European delegates, argued for
48. Id.

unilateralism.

Unilateralism provides every state a sovereign right to make
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The draft proposed by the Commission represented a
compromise, that attempted to establish an equality between

reserving and non-reserving states. 4 9

The proposed articles

protected the sovereign right of a state to make a reservation,

while safeguarding the interests of the non-reserving states,
through both the power to object and the inability of a reserving
state to invoke against an accepting state the obligations changed
by the reservation.5 0 Throughout, these provisions safeguard the
rights of all states, both reserving and non-reserving, not to be
bound without their consent.

The Commission limited the applicability of Articles 19

through 23 to multilateral agreements.5 1

The customary

international law of unanimous consent still governs reservations
to bilateral agreements. 5

2

Furthermore, in Article 20(2),5 3 the

Commission specified that if only a small number of states
participated in a treaty and the flexible system would undermine
the treaty, then the unanimity rule applied. 5 ' The decisive factor
always remained the intent of the parties, however, rather than
55
the number of states.
For multilateral treaties between large numbers of states, the
ILC proposed only the flexible system. Except for agreements
serving as the constituent documents
of international

organizations, the ILC declined to distinguish between different
unilateral reservations at will. The reserving state automatically becomes a party
to the agreement as modified by the reservation regardless of any objections by
other contracting states. The United States delegate rebutted the unilateralism
argument by emphasizing the "countervailing and equal right of all States
concerned to have a voice in the contractual commitments which are to be
binding on them." Clark, supra note 22, at 290-92.
49. ILC Report, supra note 13, at 324.
50. VCLT, supra note 1, art. 21(1)(b), 20(4)(b); ILC Report, supra note 13, at
324. Whether these safeguards actually achieved an equality Is questionable.
See Id. at 324, 325.
51. See ILC Report, supra note 13, at 318.
52. There is a debate regarding the exact status of customary international
law at that time. Western European states considered the unanimity rule
customary international law. Clark, supra note 22, at 289-91.
53. Article 20(2) of the treaty provides that:

when it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States and the
object and purpose of a treaty that the application of the treaty in its
entirety between all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of
each one to be bound by the treaty, a reservation requires acceptance by
all the parties.
VCLT, supra note 1.
54. Id.
55. ILC Report, supra note 13, at 327. The relevant inquiry for intent Is
whether the treaty should be applied in its entirety between all parties. Id.
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types of multilateral agreements. 5 6
The ILC did allow for
variation, however, by providing that parties to an agreement
57
always may specify the rules to govern reservations.

The General Assembly adopted the draft articles concerning
reservations in 1966.58
During the conference in Vienna,
however, the participants made various changes, including one

major alteration regarding reservations.5 9

After an unresolved

debate concerning whether reservations to bilateral treaties were
possible, the delegates deleted the express reference to
multilateral treaties in the title of Section Two of the treaty to

avoid prejudicing the debate.6 0
"Reservations
to
Multilateral

The title changed from
Treaties" 1
to
simply

"Reservations,"6 2 extending the scope of the reservation articles to

bilateral agreements.6

B. The ReservationArticles of the Vienna Convention
The flexible system of the Vienna Convention reversed a basic
presumption regarding reservations. Prior to the Convention, and

56. Id. at 325.
57. VCLT. supra note 1, art. 19. One may wonder, however, about the
overall effectiveness of a fundamental set of rules if treaties must always provide
express provisions.
58. Kearney & Dalton, supra note 1, at 495.
59. See kl. The newly independent states at the conference (41 of the
participating states had acquired their independence after WWII) had suspicions
regarding amendments proposed by the former imperialist powers. These states
considered the ILC text "sacrosanct" and representing "the beginning of a new
international order reflecting the views of all states."
As a result, few
amendments passed. Id. at 501-02, 533.
60. HORN, supra note 10, at 4. Some commentators might have interpreted
limiting the application of the reservation provisions to multilateral agreements as
declaring that no reservations could exist in a bilateral context.
The ILC
considered problems regarding reservations to arise only in the multilateral
context. In bilateral agreements, a reservation constituted a counteroffer. If a

state accepted the reservation, the treaty came into effect under those terms. If
the state objected to the reservation, no treaty came into force under those terms.
Only in multilateral situations when one state objects and another accepts a
reservation do problems arise. ILC Report, supra note 13, at 318. For an in depth
analysis discussing the theoretical possibility of reservations to bilateral treaties
and the debates both within the ILC and at the conference, see Richard W.
Edwards, Jr., Reservations to Treaties, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 362, at *27-28 (1989)
availableIn LEXIS, NEXIS Library; HORN, supra note 10, at 4.
61. HORN, supra note 10, at 4.
62. Edwards, supra note 60, at *27. Hungary proposed the deletion,
subsequently adopted by the Plenary Session's Drafting Committee on Apr. 29,
1969. Id.
63. Id.
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especially under the unanimity rule, states presumed that a
treaty did not allow reservations unless it expressly provided
otherwise. 64 Any reservation required acceptance by all parties
before attaining legal effect.6 5
The Convention framework,

however, presumes that a treaty permits reservations in the
absence of express provisions to the contrary. 66 One acceptance
gives a reservation legal effect and makes the reserving state a
party to the treaty. 6 7
1. The Object and Purpose Test
The Vienna Convention addressed all reservations as one
class. Article 19(c) created a distinction only between those
reservations that are or are not compatible "with the object and
purpose of the treaty."68 Nowhere in the Convention did the
drafters specify the criteria necessary to determine compatibility.
Initially, each state must make this determination for each
reservation based on the circumstances and its own
interpretation of the treaty's object and purpose. 6 9 The issue of
compatibility ultimately remains a question of law reviewable by
the ICJ upon request.70 Article 20 then detailed the basic
framework for accepting and objecting to reservations 7 1 after

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

J.M. Ruda, Reservations to Treaties, 146 R.C.A.D.I. 115, 180 (1975).
Id.; HoRN. supra note 10, at 15.
VCLT, supra note 1, art. 19; see also Ruda, supra note 64, at 180.
VCLT, supra note 1, art. 20, 5.
VCLT, supra note 1, art. 19. Article 19 addresses the permissibility of

reservations, allowing a reservation:

unless:
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not
include the reservation in question, may be made; or
(c) in cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a)and (b), the reservation is
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.
Id.
69.

Ruda, supra note 64, at 182. Although the compatibility test appears

objective in Article 19(c), Article 20 transforms this criterion into a subjective
standard by requiring each state to form an independent Judgment on the matter.
Id.
70. HoRN, supra note 10, at 117-19, 121-22. See, e.g., Genocide Convention
Opinion, supra note 24.
71. Article 20 reads:

1. A reservation expressly authorized by a treaty does not require any
subsequent acceptance by the other contracting States unless the treaty
so provides.
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compatibility is determined under Article 19. Article 20 provides
for a subjective analysis of whether a compatible reservation is
72
acceptable.
Article 19 allows two readings of the object and purpose test:
(1) a one-tier test based on compatibility with the treaty,
interpreting permissibility and acceptability under Articles 19 and
20 as the same thing, or (2) a two-tier test analyzing first
permissibility under Article 19 and then acceptability under
Article 20. 7 3 The text of Article 19(c) does not favor either

2. When it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States and
the object and purpose of a treaty that the application of the treaty in its
entirety between all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of
each one to be bound by the treaty, a reservation requires acceptance by
all the parties.
3. When a

treaty is a

constituent

instrument of an international

organization and unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the
acceptance of the competent organ of that organization.
4. In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs and unless the
treaty otherwise provides:
(a) acceptance by another contracting State of a reservation
constitutes the reserving State a party to the treaty in relation to that
other State if or when the treaty is in force for those States;

(b) an objection by another contracting State to a reservation does not
preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and
reserving States unless a contrary intention is definitely expressed by
the objecting State;
(c) an act expressing a State's consent to be bound by the treaty and
containing a reservation is effective as soon as at least one other
contracting State has accepted the reservation.
5. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4 and unless the treaty
otherwise provides, a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a
State if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the end of a
period of twelve months after it was notified of the reservation or by the
date which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is
later.
VCLT, supra note 1, art. 20.
72. See Id. The Treaty establishes no oversight mechanism to evaluate the
standards used by states to determine whether a reservation is "incompatible
Objections, however, are not held to the
with the object and purpose."
compatibility criterion. At the Vienna Conference, several states, including
Australia, Denmark, and the United States, objected to limiting the power to
object, emphasizing that reservations were frequently made on other grounds.
Edwards, supra note 60, at *19. In 1966, in response to these comments, the ILC
stated that "[allthough an objection to a reservation normally indicates a refusal
to enter into treaty relations on the basis of the reservation, objections are
sometimes made for reasons of principle or policy without the intention of
precluding the entry into force of the treaty between the objecting and reserving
States." YILC (1966-11), 207.
73. Clark, supra note 22, at 302-06. Acceptability under Article 20 is also
referred to as opposability. Analysis of this second factor presupposes a
reservation's permissibility. Id. at 303.
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The one-tier test requires
interpretation over the other.7 4
confronted states to question only the compatibility of the
reservation with the treaty based on the provisions of the treaty
and the intent of the drafters. 75 A confronted state may object
only if the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose
76
of the treaty.
The two-tier approach allows a confronted state to object to a
reservation
on grounds
of either impermissibility
or
unacceptability. 7 7 The Article 19 permissibility analysis focuses
on treaty interpretation: whether the reservation undermines a
central premise of the agreement. 78 If the reservation does
undermine a central premise, then it is incompatible. 79 If it does
not, then the analysis moves to the second tier acceptability
factor under Article 20.80 The acceptability issue rests on
individual policy determinations by the confronted state,
including political considerations, and allows a confronted state to
object to an otherwise permissible reservation. 8 '
A state,
however, may not object to any
reservations
expressly
authorized
82
by the terms of the agreement.
2. Manner and Effect of Acceptance and Objection
Article 20 provides a confronted state with a choice of four
responses 'to a reservation. If state A makes a reservation to a
treaty, states B and C may explicitly accept the reservation, 8 3
tacitly accept the reservation," object to the reservation, 5 or
object to the reservation with an express statement precluding the
entry into force of the treaty between the objecting and reserving

74. Id.
75. Id. at 306.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 302-03; HoRN, supra note 10. at 121.
78. Clark, supra note 22, at 303.
79. Id.
Debate continues whether a confronted state may accept a

reservation otherwise incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 302.
83. VCLT, supra note 1, art. 20, 4. § b. For the text of Article 20, see supra
note 71.
84. VCLT, supra note 1, art. 20, 5. This option is evidenced in state
practice pre-dating the Vienna Convention. ILC Report, supra note 13, at 328.
Today, tacit acceptance is the most common form of acceptance. Ruda, supra
note 13, at 184. A state tacitly accepts a reservation if It falls to object to the
reservation within 12 months. VCLT, supra note 1, art. 20, 5.
85. VCLT, supra note 1, art. 20, 4, § b.
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states. 88 Express or tacit acceptance of the reservation by state B
initiates treaty relations as modified by the reservation between
87

states A and B, the reserving and accepting states, respectively.
If state C only objects to the reservation, the treaty enters into

force between states A and C, the reserving and objecting states,
but the status of the provision that is the object of the reservation

is not clear.8 8 An objection by state C to the reservation with an
express statement precluding treaty relations between the two
states has the stated effect.8 9 Ironically, in the latter situation, if
state B has accepted the reservation, then both states A and C,
the reserving and objecting states, may be parties to9 ° the same
treaty without that treaty being in force between them.
Article 20 provides two specific exceptions to these general
rules. First, if both the limited number of parties and the object
and purpose of a treaty demonstrate that the treaty's application
in its entirety between all parties is an essential element of the

consent of each party to be bound by the treaty, then a

reservation requires the acceptance of all parties to the treaty. 9 1
Again, the intent of the negotiating states that the treaty should

86.

Id. art. 20,

4. § b.

87.

Id. art. 21,

1.

88.

Id. art. 21,

3. The extent to which the reservation applied is frequently

the subject of debate. Jerry Sztucki. Some QuestionsArisingfrom Reservations to
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 20 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 277, 290-91
(1977). Some members of the ILC noted that allowing a confronted state to object

to a reservation yet still enter into treaty relations with the reserving state,
excluding only those provisions to which the reservation applied, was the
functional equivalent of an acceptance, amounting to no more than a declaration
of a political character. Objecting to the "extent of the reservation" under Article
21(3) was never explicitly clarified. The phrase may refer only to the provisions of
the agreement specifically referred to in the reservation or may extend to all
provisions affected by the reservation. HoRN, supra note 10, at 144, 172-73, 28283.
State practice allows confronted states to enter extended objections. An
extended objection is based on the broader interpretation of this language,
allowing an objecting state to exclude not only the provisions specifically targeted
by the reservation but also any provisions that the objecting state considers
An extended reservation, however, technically
affected by the reservation.
qualifies as a reservation under Article l(d) of the Convention. Sztucki, supra, at
290-94.
89. VCLT, supra note 1, art. 19, 4. § b.
90. ILC Report, supra note 13, at 328. These flexible rules establish a
relative system of participation. This system envisages the possibility of every
party to a multilateral treaty not being bound by the treaty vis-A-vis every other
party. Id.
91. VCLT, supra note 1, art. 20, 2; 1LC Report, supra note 13, at 331.
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be applied in its entirety between all parties-not the
number of
92
states--determines whether the exception is invoked.

Second, Article 20(3) provides that reservations to constituent
instruments of international organizations require acceptance by
the competent organ of the organization. 93 This exception allows

the members of the organization, through the competent organ, to
determine how far any relaxation of the integrity of the
instrument may extend. 94 In the case of constituent instruments
alone did the Commission and negotiating states consider the
need for the integrity of the agreement to outweigh the other
95
considerations.

III.

APPLYING THE VIENNA CONVENTION FRAMEWORK TO TREATIES

Most international agreements fit into one of two categories:
reciprocal rights treaties or legislative treaties.9
Despite
significant differences between the two, the Vienna Convention
attempted to establish one framework to govern reservations to all
treaties.
An examination of the effects of the Convention's
provisions on different types of treaties, presuming that the
negotiators included no express provisions regarding reservations,
97
illuminates the shortcomings of Articles 19 through 23.

92, ILC Report, supra note 13, at 327. The ILC had divided in its opinion on
whether an agreement among a particularly small group of states required
unanimous consent in the absence of express provisions within the agreement
governing reservations. Id. at 323.
93. VCLT, supra note 1, art. 20,
3. At the 1959 United Nations General
Assembly debates, even though the delegates expressed great opposition toward
the unanimity rule, the delegates simultaneously acknowledged certain special
exceptions, such as constituent instruments establishing international
organizations, which worked best under the unanimity rule. Schachter, supra
note 26, at 377.
94. ILC Report, supra note 13, at 327.
95. Id.
96. Clark, supra note 22, at 316. This division is not the only possibly treaty
classification. Many means of classifying treaties can be derived. This system Is
but one which works well for analyzing the impact of reservations and the need
for different rules governing reservations to different types of treaties. For another
option, see H.G. Schermers, The Suitability of Reservations to MultilateralTreaties,
6 N.T.I.R. 350 (1959) (categorizing multilateral treaties into the constitutions of
International organizations, treaties rendering mutual benefits to the statesparties, and treaties rendering benefits to others than the states-parties).
97. VCLT, supra note 1. art. 19. This provision allows the negotiating parties
to include express provisions governing the Issue of reservations for that
particular treaty. One may wonder what use the system would be under the
Vienna Convention if states always had to draft around It..
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A. ReciprocalRights Treaties
Reciprocal rights treaties are analogous to domestic contracts
in that both are written for specific parties with a specific purpose

in mind. 98 These treaties involve an exactingly negotiated balance

of reciprocal rights and obligations of each state to the other and
ordinarily concern purely private interests of states, such as
They may be either
commercial interests or extradition.9 9

Examples of such
bilateral or multilateral agreements.10°
agreements include the North Atlantic Treaty,1 0 1 the Agreement
03
02
the Convention on Extradition
on Trade in Civil Aircraft,'

between the American states, the Extradition Treaty' 0 4 between
Mexico and the United States, and the Agreement Relating to the
Establishment of a Peace Corps Program in El Salvador. 105
1. Bilateral Agreements' 0 8
Bilateral agreements have only two parties.' 0 7 As already
mentioned, the International Law Commission did not intend the
reservation provisions of the Vienna Convention to apply to
During the conference, however, the
bilateral treaties.' 0 8
delegates deleted the reference limiting these provisions to
multilateral treaties, thereby making them generally applicable to
all international agreements between states. l0 9

98. Clark, supra note 22. at 316-17. In analyzing a treaty as a contract,
Malkin described the acceptance of the treaty, in final form, by the other parties
as the consideration for a state to accept the treaty. Allowing a reservation not
only excludes a state from certain obligations, but impairs or even destroys the
other states' consideration for signing. "IT]he other signatories are not in fact
getting what they bargained for." Bishop, supra note 7. at 276.

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 63 Stat. 2241. TIAS No. 1964, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 (founding NATO).
102. In force Jan. 1, 1980, 31 U.S.T. 619. T.I.A.S. No. 9620, 1186 U.N.T.S.
170.
103. inforce Jan. 25, 1933, 49 Stat. 3111, T.S. 882, 165 L.N.T.S. 45.
104. (U.S.-Mex.), Inforce Jan. 25, 1980, 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.S. No. 9656.
105. (U.S.-EI. Salv.), Inforce Nov. 13, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 2983, T.I.A.S. No. 4899,
433 U.N.T.S. 221.
106. See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of why
the Convention applies to bilateral treaties. Particularly note the sources cited in
note 60 as to the theoretical possibility of reservations to bilateral treaties. This
discussion presumes reservations to bilateral treaties are possible.
107. GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 488 (5th ed. 1986).

108. See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
109. Id.
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In contract terms, a reservation to a bilateral treaty
constitutes a counteroffer. 1 10 Two scenarios may arise under
Article 20. First, the unanimity rule might apply under Article

20(2), which requires acceptance of the reservation by all parties
if necessary because of the limited number of parties and the
nature of the agreement. 1 1 1 If the reserving state could show,
however, that the intent of the parties as demonstrated by the
nature of the treaty did not require acceptance of the reservation
by the other party, Article 20(2) would not apply by its own
1 12
terms.
If the treaty does not fit within the specific terms of Article
20(2), the general provisions of Article 20(4) apply. 11 3 The other
state has the option of accepting the reservation based on its
determination of whether the reservation is compatible with the
object and purpose of the treaty under Article 19(c).1 1 4 According

to Article 21, if the state accepts the reservation, the treaty enters
into force as modified by the reservation. 1 15
If the state objects to the reservation, one of two scenarios
occurs. At the option of the objecting state, treaty relations may
enter into force excluding the provisions to which the reservation
pertained,31 6 or the treaty may not enter into force at all. 1 17
When objecting, a state should express its intent that the
objection preclude all treaty relations.1 1 8 Otherwise, the treaty
enters into force merely excluding the provisions to which the
reservation applied. 11 9

110. Bishop, supra note 7, at 267.

Judge Lauterpacht once noted that

"rleservations raise important questions of principle because they modify the

terms of the offer which a State in signing or ratifying or acceding to a treaty
purports to accept." Id. at 250.
111. VCLT, supra note 1, art. 20, 2.
112. See (d.
113. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
114. VCLT, supra note 1, art. 19.
115. Id. art. 21.
116. Id. art. 21, 3. The extent of a reservation frequently sparks significant
debate, especially with strongly interrelated and interdependent treaty provisions.
See Sztucki, supra note 88, at 290-91.
117. VCLT, supra note 1, art. 20, 4, § b.
118. Id. Objecting states rarely express an intent to preclude all treaty
relations with the reserving state, as demonstrated by the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in which no objecting
state explicitly excluded treaty relations with a reserving state. Clark, supra note
22, at 307.
119. VCLT, supra note 1, art. 21, 3.
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The system created by Articles 19 and 20 undermines the

negotiated balance of rights and duties. 120 Under this construct,
a state could negotiate a treaty, carefully balancing the
advantages and disadvantages, and then make a substantive

reservation at the time of ratification in an attempt to make the
treaty more favorable to its interests (and most likely less

favorable for the other party).12 1
lose. 12 2

The reserving state cannot

If the other party accepts the reservation, then the

reserving state achieves its end of rewriting the terms of the
agreement.12 3 If the other state objects, then the reserving state

is either bound to the treaty excluding those provisions to which

the reservation applied' 2 4 or not bound at all.' 2 5 In all possible
scenarios, the reserving state is not bound by the objectionable
126
but previously bargained for terms of the original agreement.

The non-reserving state loses, being forced to choose between

accepting the terms for which it did not bargain or rejecting the
result of possibly prolonged and intense negotiations, thereby
losing whatever benefits it had sought and was to gain under the

treaty.127
120. See Sztucki, supra note 88, at 299 (recognizing that states have interests
of their own which may factor into decisions regarding reservations).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 294. An "objection is incapable of providing any legal protection
against the effects of a reservation." Id.
123. Id.
124. VCLT, supra note 1, art. 21, 3.
125. Id. art. 20, T 4. § b; Sztuckl, supra note 88, at 294. Sztucki proposes
two options, either an extended objection or a total rejection of applicability of the
treaty between the two parties. Id.
A reservation is "automatically
126. Sztucki, supra note 88, at 294.
imposable" if in practice an objection has the same legal effect as an acceptance.
An objection provides the confronted state with no legal protection because an
objection results in the nonapplicability between the reserving state and the
objecting state of the provisions to which the reservation applied. Id. at 293-94.
Commentators generally agree that an objection is the equivalent of an
acceptance for reservations excluding a treaty provision, but some contend that
an objection to a reservation modifying a treaty provision has a different effect
HoRN. supra note 10, at 182.
than an acceptance of the same provision.
However, an objection to a modifying reservation only excludes the provision "to
the extent of the reservation" and does not exclude automatically the entire
provision. An objection to a modifying reservation, therefore, has the same legal
effect as an acceptance. Clark, supra note 22, at 309.
127. The non-reserving state might not lose completely in this scenario
because the non-reserving state also would no longer need perform any
obligations under those specific provisions. However, a non-reserving state could
have achieved non-performance of its obligations simply by accepting the
reservation. The non-reserving state's objection implies that the non-reserving
state considered any obligations under those provisions acceptable to achieve
whatever benefits might have been gained through the reserving state's
performance of its obligations under the same provisions.
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Article 20(5) gives the reserving state a further advantage by
allowing tacit acceptance of a reservation after twelve months if a
state-party has neither expressly accepted or objected to the
The treaty would take effect as modified. 12 9
reservation. 128
Although this scenario seems less plausible in a bilateral context
because a state presumably would keep abreast of developments
and respond more quickly under such circumstances, tacit
acceptance remains a realistic and justifiable concern.
2. Multilateral Agreements
Multilateral agreements have more than two parties, creating
a more complex set of interwoven relationships. 13 0 Multilateral
reciprocal rights agreements are often regional or universal in
scope and may address such issues as the environment,
transportation, trade, or extradition.1 3 1 The International Law

Commission intended for the provisions of the Vienna Convention

to govern reservations to multilateral agreements. 132
Applying Articles 20 and 21 in a multilateral treaty context
achieves the same result as in the bilateral treaty context: the
reserving state cannot lose. Assuming that the agreement does
not fall within the provisions of Article 20(2), which requires
acceptance of reservations by all parties because of the limited
number of states involved and the nature of the agreement, the
other parties may only accept or object. 1a
Under a two-tier analysis, states may object to a reservation
as incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty under
Article 19(c) or as unacceptable under Article 20.13

The Vienna

Convention requires subjective application of the objective criteria
for incompatibility under Article 19. Article 20 further allows
other factors, such as political ties and importance, to intrude on
a state's analysis of a reservation's acceptability, biasing that
state's individual determination.' 3 5 Frequently, states differ in

128. VCLT, supra note 1. art. 20,

129. Id. art. 21,

5.

1.

130. VON GLAHN, supra note 107, at 488.

131. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text for examples of treaties
of this sort.
132. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
133. VCLT, supra note 1, art. 20.
134. Id. arts. 19-20.
135. See Karl Zemanek, Some Unresolved Questions Concerning Reservations
In the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, In ESSAYS IN INTERNAIONAL LAW IN
HONOUR OF JUDGE MANFRED LACHs 323, 333-34 (1984) (discussing the unilateral
rights of states both to object and to accept).
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their determinations of the compatibility of a reservation under
Article 19 and the opposability of a reservation under Article 20,
as evidenced by some states' accepting a reservation while others
object to it.' 3 6 The Convention wanted 13to7 clarify the legal status
of the parties when this situation arises.
Article 21 makes states that expressly or tacitly accept the
reservation parties to the treaty with the reserving state as

modified by the terms of the reservation.13 8

The larger the

number of parties, the more likely one or more will accept the
reservation, especially with the tacit acceptance provisions in
Article 20(5).139 Many states lack the administrative resources
necessary to track all reservations and determine their
The
compatibility within the twelve-month deadline. 14 °
a
final
taking
before
necessary
processes
administrative
government position frequently hinders even those states with
14 1
substantial technical resources from meeting the deadline.
42
Thus, the reserving state almost is guaranteed party status.1
The objecting states, on the other hand, have limited
States objecting to the
recourse against a reservation.
have the option of
treaties,
reservation, as with bilateral
reserving state or
the
with
precluding all treaty relations
precluding treaty relations only as to those provisions affected by
the reservation.'4 The reserving state obtains its objective under.
either response; the terms to which a state makes a reservation
can never bind that state absent a withdrawal of the
reservation. '4

136. See Clark, supra note 22, at 282-89.
137. See VCLT, supra note 1, art. 21.
1. This scenario presumes that the
138. VCLT, supra note 1, art. 21,
reservation is not automatically impermissible under Article 19 (a) or (b). See

supranote 68 for the text of Article 19.
139. See ILC Report, supra note 13, at 323. The larger the number of parties,

the more likely one will neglect to accept or object within the 12 month period,
thereafter being deemed to have assented tacitly to the reservation, making the
state a party to the treaty. See kd
140. Clark, supranote 22. at 312.

141. Id.
142. See Ie. at 312-13 Under Article 20(4)(c). a reserving state becomes a
party to a treaty as soon as one other party accepts the reservation. VCLT, supra
note 1, art. 20, 4.
143. VCLT, supranote 1, arts. 20, 21.
144. ILC Report, supra note 13, at 324. See supra notes 126-27 and
accompanying text for a discussion of why the reserving state never loses. If the
point was important enough to make, however, why withdraw? If the reserving
state is only trying to obtain a better agreement, it is attempting to renegotiate,
and the ratification stage is not the proper time and a reservation not the proper
means for renegotiating. One reservation could spark an endless series of
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The differences between regional multilateral treaties and
more universal multilateral treaties also affect the policies
underlying the Convention's hybrid approach. Parties to regional

agreements typically present a more homogeneous class, 145 with

common interests and backgrounds that provide additional bases
of understanding. Reservations, therefore, are less likely because
all of the parties have similar interests. The provisions also tend
to have a comparable impact on all of the parties because strongly
objectionable provisions probably would be objectionable to the
majority of parties and, therefore, would never be included in the
first place. 146
The absence of this homogeneity at the global level may
inspire additional reservations to more universal multilateral
treaties. Parties to universal multilateral treaties ordinarily have
more diverse cultural, political, and economic backgrounds and
interests, making certain provisions less desirable for some
states. 4 7 In such situations, the parties must make greater
compromises to arrive at an original agreement.148
More
reservations are likely because certain provisions inevitably will
have disparate impacts, advantaging or disadvantaging select
states more than others.14 9
Reservations may facilitate
.agreement, but they also simultaneously undermine the
agreement by splintering the multilateral treaty into a network of
bilateral and plurilateral agreements.' 5 0 Multiple states can be
parties to the same treaty without that treaty being in force
between them. 15 '

reservations. Frequently one state will make a reservation in accepting the
reservation of another state. See Sztucki, supra note 88, at 294.
145. See ILC Report, supra note 13, at 321.

146. If all the negotiating states' interests are similar, then the provision
would be mutually distasteful and therefore less likely to be put in the treaty.
This situation is neither an absolute nor limited to the regional context but would
logically occur more often in that context.

147. See ILC Report, supra note 13, at 324. For example, certain provisions of
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
appealed less to Muslim states. See Clark, supra note 22, at 284.
148. The parties frequently use majority voting in agreeing on the individual
provisions of the treaty. Bishop, supra note 7, at 288.
149. See Sztucki, supra note 88, at 300 (discussing compatibility versus
opposability). The opposite scenario might occur in this context too. Some global

agreements come closer to the lowest common denominator, thus including few if
any objectionable provisions.

Unfortunately, the lowest common denominator

frequently contains less substance as well.
150. Schermers, supranote 96, at 351.

151. Id.
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B. Legislative Treaties

A legislative treaty regulates a specific area of international
law, representing the parties' agreed-upon understanding of the
law, either as it is or as they want it to be.1 5 2 With these
agreements, there is usually a greater interest in protecting the
integrity of the treaty, but a high degree of participation is still
desirable. 153
This category includes agreements such as
codifications of customary international law, agreements
governing international conduct, and constituent documents of
international organizations. 1 r4
1. Codifications of Customary International Law
Codifications purport to reflect the current status of
These agreements ordinarily
customary international law. i 5
strive for universal participation1 5 6 because the underlying
customary international law already binds all states.1 57 With
such a large number of parties, codifications would not fall under
Article 20(2) requiring acceptance of a reservation by all parties.
Therefore, under the Vienna Convention, in the absence of
express provisions to the contrary, reservations to provisions of a
158
codification are permissible.
Thus, the Convention is logically inconsistent. As customary
international law, the law applies to all states, yet as a
codification of customary international law, states may opt not to
be subject to this law as conventional international law. Other
states would most likely object to such a reservation. Without
objective criteria to restrict a state's determination of
compatibility under Article 19 and acceptability under Article 20,
combined with the concept of tacit acceptance, however, the
reserving state is likely to become a party to the codification as
modified vis-A-vis at least a few other states.1 5 9

152. See Clark, supra note 22, at 316-17.
153. Id.
154. Id. Human rights agreements, which may be either codifications of

customary international law or agreements regulating international conduct,
depending on the content, generally attract large numbers of reservations. Id. at
283.
155. See Louis HENmN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 74 (2d
ed. 1987).
156. See ILC Report, supra note 13, at 260.
157. HENKIN, supra note 155, at 10-12. Persistent objectors, if theoretically
possible, represent a possible exception. Id. at 131, 1253 n. 2.
158. VCLT, supra note 1, art. 19.
159. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
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Codifications of international standards characterized as Jus
cogensL60 pose a particular problem under the Convention's

framework.

Although later articles of the Convention prohibit

treaties conflicting with Jus cogens and automatically void
them,18 1 the drafters did not prohibit reservations to treaties
concerning jus cogens. Under .Articles 19 through 23, a state
arguably could propose a reservation to a tenet of Jus cogens,
again almost certain of tacit acceptance by a few states, and
16 2
thereby circumscribe a peremptory norm of international law.
If a state may not violatejus cogens outside a treaty, It should not
be able to make a reservation to that effect within a treaty. 16
The drafters certainly could not have intended to give states .this
option, but the Convention's flexible system favors universality
over integrity. I 4
2. Agreements Regulating International Conduct
Treaties regulating international conduct typically establish
These treaties
principles governing the actions of states. 6 5
thereby
effectuating
maximum
participation,
function best with
L6 6
Moreover, such
the objective of one standard of conduct.
160. Jus cogens refers to peremptory norms of international law. VCLT, supra
note 1, art. 53.
161. Id.
162. See ILC Report, supra note 13, at 323.
163. Note that quite likely under Article 53 the treaty as applied between the
reserving and accepting states would be void as violatingJus cogens. However, a

state could tailor the reservation so that the modified provisions do not conflict
with Jus cogens, but merely remove that state from the sphere of applicability of,
that norm. A state could then be a party to such a treaty without those
provisions being enforceable against it, giving it a stronger argument that the
norm Is not Jus cogens. The law of Jus cogens also continues to evolve. A
reservation to a codificatory treaty could have the opposite effect of advanclngJus
For an interesting analysis of the possibility of developing
cogens norms.
customary international legal norms other than by state practice, see Jonathan I.
Charney, UniversalInternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (1993).
164. Schachter. supra note 26, at 374; Bishop, supra note 7, at 275-76; see
also ILC Report, supra note 14, at 324.
Examples of treaties regulating
165. Clark, supra note 22, at 316-17.
international conduct include the Genocide Convention and the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, openedfor signature
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951); International
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, openedfor
signatureDec. 21, 1965, DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1988, 5 I.L.M. 352.
166. ILC Report, supra note 13, at 324. Sometimes "fewer parties to a treaty
is more of an obstacle to the development of international law than the possibility
of weakening the integrity by liberal admission of reserving States." Id.
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agreements rarely advantage or disadvantage particular states
and have no contractual balance of rights and obligations to be
87
maintained.1
Negotiating states frequently use majority voting procedures
for treaties regulating international conduct to facilitate the
treaty-making process. 168 Reservations further this end. States
that could not otherwise join the treaty because of some domestic
law conflict now may make minor procedural reservations and
become parties. However, the broad reservations permitted under
the Vienna Convention also allow a state to propose substantive
reservations, possibly even reservations undermining the purpose
of the treaty.' 6 9 The subjective acceptance criteria, as well as
tacit acceptance after twelve months, almost guarantees that
some state will consent to the reservation, making the reserving
state a party.170
3. Constituent Documents of International Organizations
As discussed earlier, Article 20(2) establishes a special rule
governing reservations to constituent documents of international
organizations. The members of the organization, through the
competent organ, make the ultimate decision on the permissibility

167. Bishop, supra note 7, at 288.
168. Id. at 264. Majority voting reflects a new means of adopting treaties.

Negotiations between a small number of parties allows for a greater chance of
complete agreement (or at least compromise) on all terms to the treaty. With an
ever-increasing number of states participating In multilateral negotiations,
consensus rather than complete agreement serves as the goal.
The parties adopt the text of the treaty by majority vote or consensus voting.
Attempting to reach complete compromise among a large number of states would
slow the negotiating process and possibly stall treaties all together. Under the
majority system, unless a party has a major disagreement with a specific
provision, the negotiators adopt the text. States then make reservations to
resolve any minor disagreements with various provisions.
Reservations are essential to a majority voting scheme. Without reservations
states might never agree on a final text. The use of reservations then permits
states to agree on the basic premises of a treaty without having to agree on every
detail. See generally Id. at 264.
169. Again, the subjective application of the Article 19 criteria allows a stateparty to accept an impermissible reservation. The other states-parties to the
agreement do have recourse, however, through judicial review, for the question of
permissibility under Article 19 Is a question of law and judicially determinable.
170. ILC Report, supra note 13, at 323. Reservations to human rights treaties
pose additional problems, similar to those arising with codifications. See Clark,
supra note 22 (examining the particular problems of applying the Convention's
framework to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women and human rights treaties generally).
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of reservations. 17 1 This special provision acknowledges the
exceptional nature of these instruments.
The International Law Commission and the negotiators at
Vienna understood a special need to protect the integrity of
constituent documents. 17 2 They assigned to the international
organization itself the duty of balancing this need against the
desire for broader participation rather than having the standard
presumption apply. 17 3 The member states as a whole, via the
competent organ, decide whether to accept the reservation,
allowing the parties as one body to choose universality or
17 4
uniformity.
IV. ELIMINATING DEFAULT RULES: AN ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM

The default rules of the Convention governing reservations
should be discarded. Many international scholars have noted
that "no single framework uniformly applied could be wholly
satisfactory to cover all cases."1 7 5 The existence of such rules
encourages reliance on them. Discarding the rules would require
the drafters of every international agreement to give more thought
to whether reservations to that agreement should be allowed and,
if they should be allowed, to which provisions. The drafters could

then incorporate these decisions into the terms of the agreement

itself.176 This system creates a specially-tailored set of rules for
every agreement. Although Article 19 of the Convention currently
allows the drafters this option, the existence of default rules
encourages drafters not to weigh the issue as seriously and to rely
on the Convention's framework to resolve questions concerning
reservations.

171. VCLT, supra note 1, art. 20,

2. This system was consistent with the

established practice for admitting new members to those organizations. ROSENNE,
supra note 25, at 218-23.
172. ILC Report, supra note 13, at 327. The drafters considered the integrity
of these instruments to outweigh all other considerations. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. ILC Report, supra note 13, at 320; Clark, supra note 22, at 282 (quoting

Lord McNair's belief that tailoring individual reservation regimes for every treaty is
an "imperative necessity"). The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea presents a
notable example. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. DocA/CONF.62/122, art. 309, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261

(1982).
176. This is now common practice, as demonstrated by the 1982 United
Nations Third Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 175.
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If entirely discarding the Convention's reservation framework
seems drastic to some commentators, three modifications would
improve the current framework governing reservations to treaties.
First, reversing the presumption of acceptability of reservations to
favor the confronted states would bar default acceptance of
reservations for noncompliance with technical rules and force the
confronted states to either accept or object to every reservation.
Second, adopting different frameworks for different types of
international agreements would better address the policy
concerns for reservations to each type of agreement.
In the
alternative to the second suggestion, establishing an authoritative
decision-maker would depoliticize the process and better preserve
the integrity of the agreement.

A. Reversing the Presumption
The Vienna Convention's current framework presumes the
permissibility of reservations to treaties. 17 7 The tacit acceptance
provision of Article 20(5) transforms this presumption of
permissibility into a presumption of acceptability favoring the
reserving state and its reservation. 17 8 This presumption of tacit
consent should be reversed because of the high burden imposed
on confronted states.
Prior to the Vienna Convention, reservations to treaties were
presumed impermissible and unacceptable, whether under the
unanimity rule, the Pan-American system, the principle of the
Genocide Convention, or the collegiate system. 179
If the
confronted states failed to respond, the reserving state did not
become a party to the agreement.' 8 0 Under the Convention, the
reserving state automatically becomes a party to the agreement as
modified by its reservation if any other party fails to respond
within twelve months.' 8 ' The Convention forces the confronted
states to evaluate the reservation and funnel a response through
the appropriate political and administrative channels within the

177. See VCLT, supra note 1, arts. 19, 20, 5.
178. Clark, supra note 22, at 312-14 (arguing against the 12 month tacit

acceptance rule).
179. See HoRN, supra note 10, at
325, 328; Bishop, supra note 7, at
Opinion, supra note 24, at 23-24.
180. See HoRN, supra note 10, at
325, 328; Bishop, supra note 7, at
Opinion, supra note 24, at 23-24.
181. VCLT, supra note 1, art. 20,

15-16, 30; ILC Report, supra note 13, at
275-280, 288-89; Genocide Convention
15-16, 30; ILC Report, supra note 13, at
275-280, 288-89; Genocide Convention
5.
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relatively short period.1 82 Failure to do so allows the reserving
state to rewrite the treaty unilaterally. After the twelve month
period, a confronted state's only recourse would be to withdraw
from the treaty or to terminate the treaty if this recourse is
possible and permissible. 183

B. Different Frameworksfor Different Types of International
Agreements

The Convention's framework imposes one artificial framework
to govern reservations to all types of treaties. This framework
inadequately serves the needs of the different types of
international agreements. 1 s 4 Separate frameworks tailored to
meet the specific needs of different types of treaties would better
serve the interests of the international community and the
policies underlying the agreements.
1. Bilateral Reciprocal Rights Agreements
The unanimity rule best governs reservations to bilateral
agreements because it furthers the interests of both parties to the
agreement. As discussed earlier, an international agreement 18at5
the bilateral level resembles a contract between the two states.
Reservation at the time of ratification is equivalent to an attempt
by one party to alter the terms of the agreement. The unanimity
rule would reverse the current presumption of acceptability under
the Convention, presuming a reservation ineffective unless
expressly accepted by the confronted state.
2. Multilateral Reciprocal Rights Agreements
The collegiate system best governs reservations to
multilateral reciprocal rights agreements, and it should require
acceptance of a reservation by a majority, but better yet by two-

thirds or three-fourths, of the states-parties. 186 Requiring this
high percentage of parties to accept a reservation checks each
182. Clark, supra note 22, at 312. A lack of administrative infrastructure and
political considerations often hinder states from responding within the 12 month
period. Id.
183. Withdrawing from or terminating the treaty may involve breaching the
agreement, facing sanctions, and losing the benefits of the agreement, in addition
to gaining an undesirable international reputation.
184. See supra part Ill.
185. See supra notes 110-27 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
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individual state's determination of the acceptability of the
reservation. This system guards against politicization of the
process because multiple states must reach the same
conclusion.187 Again, this framework utilizes a presumption of
ineffectiveness until accepted by a majority of parties, reversing
the Convention's presumption of acceptance.
This system also guards against excessive fragmentation of
multilateral agreements. The high degree of consensus necessary
to accept a reservation would prevent the agreement from
denigrating into a network of bilateral and plurilateral
agreements. One acceptance alone would no longer allow the
reserving state to become a party to the agreement. All statesparties would enter into the same relationship with the reserving

state.
3. Legislative Treaties

a. Codifications of Customary International Law
True codifications of international law require application of
the unanimity rule. As discussed earlier, states may not reserve
themselves out of customary international law obligations. 1 88
Agreements representing simultaneous codification of customary
international law and progressive development of the law also
should require application of the unanimity rule. The drafters of
these treaties ordinarily intended the progressive development
provisions to evolve into customary international law. Allowing
reservations at the time of ratification would undermine the
integrity of these provisions and hinder their future acceptance as
law.1 8 9 The framework of the unanimity rule best serves the
policy needs of such agreements.

187. Politicization is still possible if one state equals greater than one-fourth
or one-third of the parties or its decision is the deciding one.
188. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text. A counter-argument
provides that allowing reservations at that time, however, would allow for
continued disagreement as to the trend of progressive development of the law. A
state, however, could always become a party to the.agreement and merely make
public declarations that those provisions were not customary international law.
189. Substantive reservations to progressive development provisions also
could later be used by the reserving states as evidence of the rule not being
customary international law or at least of their status as a persistent objector to
the rule if it had so evolved, further undercutting respect for the rule.
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b. Agreements Regulating International Conduct
A collegiate system best serves the policy goals of treaties
regulating international conduct. These agreements strive for a
high degree of participation but simultaneously require
substantial uniformity in the application of its provisions. The
collegiate system in this context would serve the same purposes
as in the multilateral reciprocal rights agreement context. If a
majority of states-parties understood a reservation to undermine
the basic principles of the agreement, these states could preclude
the reserving state from becoming a party to the agreement. The

majority requirement insulates the process to an extent from
The collegiate system prevents a
excessive politicization.
reserving state from becoming a party to the agreement for the
sake of political correctness while in effect shirking all substantive
obligations under the agreement.
c. Constituent Documents of International Organizations
governing
constituent
The
Convention's
provisions
documents of international organizations address well the needs
The Convention's special terms
of these agreements. 9 °
entrusting the members, through the international organization,
with determining the acceptability of a reservation allow the
states-parties to maintain the integrity of the agreement without
rigidly prohibiting all minor reservations. 91 The states-parties
themselves must evaluate whether a ratification with reservation
sufficiently binds the reserving state to the agreement.
C. Establishingan AuthoritativeDecision-Maker

Establishing one decision-maker to determine the
compatibility of reservations offers an alternative to adopting the
different frameworks for each category of treaty. The appointment
of one authority to apply the test would depoliticize the process
and would both increase the consistency of determinations and
better preserve the integrity of the agreement.
This concept depends on several factors: state consent;
appointment of a central decision-maker; and a one-tier

approach. Removing the decision whether to accept or object to a
reservation from the states-parties themselves would require their
explicit consent. The current system allows states to apply the
190. See VCLT, supra note 1. art. 20, 3.
191. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
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"object and purpose" test using their own subjective criteria. This
relinquishment, however, would not come without benefits. One
decision-maker would provide reserving states with assurance
that their reservations would be evaluated strictly on their merit
rather than on political factors. The confronted states would
benefit from all states-parties' entering into the same treaty
relations with the reserving state, minimizing the fragmentation of
the agreement.
The international community could place responsibility on
the drafters of each agreement to designate a decision-maker,
either an individual or an entity, and specify the bases on which
that decision-maker should makes its determinations, or create a

default rule automatically appointing someone, such as the
Under either approach, the
depositary, as decision-maker.
depositary would be the most convenient person to perform this
By receiving instruments of ratification and tallying
task.
membership, the depositary is aware of reservations fied by any
prospective party. The depositary easily could apply an objective
compatibility test at that time. The drafters" could establish a
review process so that if a specified majority of the states-parties
disagreed with the depositary's ruling, they could override its
determination. Otherwise the decision would stand, with parties
responding accordingly.
The central decision-maker approach would work best under
a one-tier system.1 92 The one-tier approach limits a party's right
to object to a reservation to incompatibility with the object and
purpose of the treaty.193 If the decisionmaker decided the
reservation was permissible, and therefore compatible with the
agreement, the states-parties to the agreement would be unable
to object to the reservation. Yet, if the decision-maker determined
the reservation incompatible with the "object and purpose" of the
agreement, the parties would have to accept the reservation.
A two-tier system would work only if the decision-maker
determined both compatibility and acceptability. 19 4 The statesparties otherwise would retain the power to object to the
reservation on the basis of unacceptability even if compatible.
Presumably, no state-party would argue an incompatible
reservation were acceptable, although the possibility would exist.
Having one central decision-maker therefore would work best with

192. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (explaining the one-tier
approach).
193. Id.
194. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (explaining the two-tier
approach).
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the one-tier approach, under which a state could not undermine
the decision-maker's final ruling.
The different frameworks advocated in Part 1V.B. obviate the
necessity of establishing an authoritative decision-maker by using
frameworks requiring a high degree of consensus.
One
authoritative decision-maker and the high degree of consensus
both obtain the same end-uniformity of result, minimizing the
likelihood of political abuse of the process. An impartial decisionmaker better achieves this end, but states may not be willing to
relinquish so much authority to a third-party. Either system

would work best in combination with reversing the presumption
favoring acceptability.
V. CONCLUSION
The flexible construct adopted by the Vienna Convention
holds potential for'great abuse. The lack of objective criteria for
determining compatibility combined with a state's right to make
reservations can quickly transform a treaty into a fragmented
series of bilateral or plurilateral agreements sharing only a
title. 19 r In providing a new framework to correct the problems of
the unanimity principle, the drafters of the Vienna Convention
swung the pendulum too far. They did not achieve balance but
established a new bias, one favoring the reserving state at the
expense of the non-reserving states and the integrity of the
agreements.1 95
Treaty law governing reservations evolved tremendously in
the post-World War II era. However, this evolution has stagnated
at a crucial point. After the Vienna Convention, the search for
new constructs seems to have disappeared. Rather than striving
for ways to improve the system, the international community has
accepted the Convention as the final word on the issue.1 97 With
195. Schermers, supra note 96, at 351.
196. ILC Report, supra note 13, at 324. The ILC conceded that its safeguards
for the non-reserving states failed to achieve full equality between the reserving
and non-reserving states. Id. In his dissent in the Genocide Convention Opinion,
Judge Alvarez noted that allowing reservations gives some "legal effect in favour of

the states making the reservation." Genocide Convention Opinion, supra note 24,
at 44.
197. The 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and
International Organizations or Between International Organizations evidences the

lack of development of international law regarding reservations. The articles of
this second Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties concerning reservations
parallel the framework established in the 1969 Convention. See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International
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the recent shifts in international relations, and a greater
willingness on the part of states to cooperate to achieve mutually
beneficial ends, the international community may be more willing
to decide these points now than the International Law
Commission believed states were in the 1960s. 198
Ideally, states should discard the default rules and draft
specific reservations provisions for each international agreement.
The Vienna Convention left states this option which they have too

frequently failed to use.

In the absence of discarding the

Convention's framework, the three simple modifications proposed
in this Note, reversing the presumption of acceptability, adopting
different frameworks best-suited for different types of treaties, or
establishing an authoritative decision-maker, would significantly
enhance the current, framework and help to shift the pendulum
back closer to the center. The changes would allow for the
exercise of a state's sovereign right to make reservations while
better protecting the confronted states' rights to object and
protect the integrity of the treaty.
Daniel N. Hylton*

Organizations or Between International Organizations, done at Vienna, Mar. 21,
1986, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/15 (1986). reprinted In 25 I.L.M. 543 (1986). The
inclusion of more provisions governing reservations within specific agreements

does not evidence the forging of change but simply the inadequacies of the
current framework and the need for continued evolution of universally applicable
rules.
198. See generally Kearney & Dalton, supra note 1 (discussing the difficulties
of adopting the Convention in its current form).
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